1		COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA			
2	GAMING CONTROL BOARD				
3	* * * * * *				
4	IN RE: HSP GAMING, LP (SUGARHOUSE) - PETITION TO				
5	INTERVENE IN THE CATEGORY 2 PROCEEDINGS				
6		* * * * * * *			
7		PUBLIC HEARING			
8		* * * * * * *			
9	BEFORE:	WILLIAM H. RYAN, JR., Chairman			
10		Gregory C. Fajt; Anthony C. Moscato;			
11		Annemarie Kaiser; Keith R. McCall; John			
12		J. McNally; David W. Woods; Members,			
13		Jennifer Langan, representing Robert			
14		McCord, State Treasurer, Robert P.			
15		Coyne, representing Daniel P. Meuser,			
16		Secretary of Revenue Jorge Augusto,			
17		Representing George Greig, Secretary			
18		of Agriculture			
19	HEARING:	Wednesday, January 8, 2014			
20	LOCATION:	Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board			
21		Strawberry Square Complex, 2nd Floor			
22		Harrisburg, PA 17101			
23		Reporter: Lacey C. Gray			
24	Any repro	oduction of this transcript is prohibited			
25	without	authorization by the certifying agency.			

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#### CHAIRMAN:

All right. Now, having established that HSP is the only Petitioner in this proceeding, we will begin our final hearing prior to our public meeting, specifically the hearing on HSP's Petition to Intervene in the Category 2 proceedings.

Counselor, you're on again.

## ATTORNEY DONNELLY:

Thank you. First of all, I don't mean to --- by using adversarial I'm using it in general terms. I recognize --- I agree with what Mr. Miller put on the record as to Office of Enforcement Counsel's (OEC) role here. I may slip and continue to call them as an adversary but I don't mean that literally in a legal term.

The standard for intervention in an administrative proceeding, especially before this Board, the bar is very low. I do take issue with the recitation of what the standard is. I don't think that's a standard and I don't think that it's set forth in the current version of the regulations.

I don't think that purports with the Bensalem case, which addressed this issue or the

Supreme Court's case in Society Hill case.

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Essentially the way I understand what the Court and the Supreme Court said and Bensalem said is, you have to look at these things two different ways. First of all, intervention. At the administrative level all a person or an entity needs shown is a direct interest and that direct interest can be a competitor. I think that was made quite clear by both courts. Once you have that interest of a direct competitor you are eligible for intervention.

I'll come back to whether intervention must be granted, but it's clear, I think, without argument that we have met the standard of eligibility. There is a second standard and that is of standing, and the standing standard comes in at a later stage in the proceedings at a court level. And standing --- as OEC pointed out earlier, standing is a concept essentially developed by the federal courts and imported into the state courts.

And it has to do with concepts that are not present here. It has to do with concepts such as separation of powers, whether federal court should be interfering or whether a court should be interfering with things that legislators do or executives do.

So, when a litigant appears before a court, the

judicial branch, the Court is supposed to put its hat on and say, well, I've got to think about who that litigant is. I'm one of three co-equal branches.

And part of whether I hear from the litigant is to show respect, be it a judicial respect or a Constitutional respect to my other branch. So, that's one element of standing.

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Another important element of standing that we don't have here, that we don't have the first one, is the question of whether or not you have an administrative proceeding. In this particular action the administrative entity in question is a branch of the executive. So, you don't have those --- the separation of power issues. Second issue that you often see in standing cases is where someone is asking federal court to overcome a state court action.

Obviously, we don't have that here. We don't have the problems that the federal court developed these concepts of standing and adjudication based on the Federal Constitution. We don't have that problem here because this is all state issue. We don't have the federalism issue of standing that usually causes a standing problem because no one is asking federal court to do anything here. So, we

don't have a separation of powers problem. We don't have a federalism problem.

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Thirdly, as I think probably more importantly --- I may be running too long --- the Supreme Court made it plain that those are two different concepts. The concept of standing versus the concept of intervention. And as the previous Applicant made the point that the Court made it clear that a person who has a direct interest is to do exactly what we're doing here, move to intervene before the administrative agency. And once we have intervened before the administrative agency, should we take a litigated matter to the Court, the Court would then apply a different standard for standing.

And that different standard is direct immediate and not being adequately represented by any other party. Standard at this level is just direct. It's not immediate. It's not substantial. It's not whether other parties can represent. So, I come back and I think the Ccourts have made it quite clear that we have a direct interest in these proceedings at Sugarhouse where a competitor would put out a lengthy written statement.

We've proffered a relatively lengthy expert report to address the elements of competition.

1 I don't think that this is the appropriate time to go :57:34 2 into the merits. I know it isn't. So, I won't do :57:37 3 that, but I do want to point out that in our written :57:40 statement and in the expert report we noted that the 4 :57:43 5 --- what the legislature of this Commonwealth has :57:48 already recognized, that there is extreme competition 6 :57:51 7 that has been created in the --- whatever market you :57:55 8 want to define, Philadelphia area market, the :58:00 9 Mid-Atlantic or the northeast, since the statute was :58:04 adopted in 2004. New York, as this Board is well :58:06 10 11 aware because I know it watches these matters very :58:13 12 closely, it's coming online now. Delaware is :58:16 13 expanding. New Jersey just went internet. :58:19 14 Pennsylvania itself is considering internet. :58:23 15 Pennsylvania has the tavern bills. Maryland is :58:26 16 expanding, recently expanded in --- Baltimore area is :58:30 17 now going to develop a casino outside of the :58:34 18 Washington area. :58:38

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So, we're essentially being surrounded by competition, Ohio. All of these factor in. It's not a happy situation at all and part of the purpose of having someone like Sugarhouse to come in to intervene is to try to put those elements forth.

Now, as I stated before, a couple of the --- my adversaries do not object to the intervention. I

don't understand that Market 8 or Stadium object to intervention, however, they do have conditions that they would like the Board to impose.

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There are varying conditions, I won't go over them all. You can find them online, but we have no problem with agreeing to meet the time tables that are set forth with the Board, follow the Board's rules and play and color with inside the lines. We certainly intend to do that.

The real objections are --- the objections of OEC are essentially that the written statement and petition are in some cases hearsay and some cases just set forth generalized statements of competition. Well, at this stage of the proceeding, as I understand your rules and regulations, that is what we are supposed to do. We're supposed to send in a written statement as one of the adversaries did know. The written statement is to put the adversaries on notice as to what you want to intervene in and what you intend to --- you know, kind of giving a generalized presentation as to what your theory is.

If we're granted intervention status we will take that written statement, add appropriate citations and perhaps alter or amend it as we

reserved our right to do, but when it is submitted, if we're permitted the authority to submit it, it will have --- it'll be a document that at least the Board can take, if nothing else, judicial notice of given the facts --- for the most part facts set forth in there are public record.

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additional casinos. Moreover, one of the purposes of sending around, circulating the expert report before the hearing was to have the expert endorse the facts in that --- in the written statement. An expert can rely on hearsay in forming his opinions and the expert in this case adopted the facts set forth in the written statement and added some and, of course, gave some preliminary opinions and so on.

Not only do we fall squarely into the <u>Bensalem</u> and <u>Society Hill</u> case, we also fall squarely into the rules of appellate procedure. I think it's 35.28, which has directly affected, not directly, substantial and immediate. I do want to address --- it has three rules there, directly affected, not adequately represent and may be bound by the ruling. Well, we'll certainly be bound by a ruling that this Board makes.

We are directly affected. I think it's clear under --- under case law I cited. And the case law also addressed the general rules of appellate procedure. I won't go over it again because I know this Board is familiar with both of those cases. We fall squarely into that. As to adequately represented, we've raised a number of issues that have not been raised to my knowledge, and certainly I haven't heard or seen written any analysis of the competition that's going on coming down the pike, what's going on in Atlantic City, what's going on in these other states or what's going on in the Commonwealth. I haven't seen any of that.

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I have seen that the legislature has acknowledged it and recognized it, and is right now out with a request for proposals to do a study in this matter and to make a determination as to what, if anything, the Commonwealth should do to look at its gaming loss, that no one is raising. I don't believe anyone has raised 1304 and 1330. The two statutory provisions that we put forth in our written statement, which I believe affects at least three of the Applicants and maybe more. There's one of the things I put forth.

I did my very best to dig through the

public records to determine what the ownership is and the Board has a very good --- but difficult to decipher, but very good site to go through that. But I do not know and will not know, I don't think our client will know for sure, what all these interests are until such times as we get into the licensing proceedings. In interest of time, we have a way of sliding around. There are management companies involved. There may be changes in ownership by the time we get to licensing. No one has raised those issues at all.

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And finally no one's looking at, I
don't think for Sugarhouse, is that --- Sugarhouse is
what I used in the petition, it's parties who are
interested in what Sugarhouse does. We have a number
of interests. We have interests in people who own
the property, interests in our employees, we have
interests of the city and interests of the
foundation. We have interests of a special services
district. Just really watch --- I'm sure the Mummers
the other day, Sugarhouse sponsors the Mummers
Parade.

Sugarhouse has to look out --- and it's easy to say, well, you're just looking out for your profits. Well, we're not just looking out for our

profits. As most of the people, a number of the Commissioners are aware of, I've spent probably 35 years in dealing with casinos and a lot of them in New Jersey, and I still represent casinos in New Jersey. I've seen firsthand what happens when you have too much competition.

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There's only certain things that businesses can do to survive. They have mortgages, they have fixed duties, taxes and mortgages. And when there is insufficient revenues coming in there's only so many levers that people can pull. And those levers I will submit --- and if granted intervention our expert in the testimony we'll put in will try to point that out to support it. Because those levers are not good, in our opinion, for the Commonwealth. It causes people to start worrying about capital expenditure because you can cut back on something like that, start worrying about expansions, start worrying about whether you're hiring new employees or promoting employees.

And I've seen it and, like I said, one of the statistics I put in with the petition was we've seen a decline in revenues there of almost 40 percent. Almost to the point, five billion to three billion. And almost to the same numbers.

Approximate number of employees go from about 50,000 to about 30,000. It's not a happy scene out there and one of the things casinos can control are revenues and may well be determined that there are additional revenues, but having additional revenues is not a good thing for the long term success in the state --- Commonwealth.

I also want to point out to a special interest of not being adequately represented ---.

## CHAIRMAN:

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Counselor, just ask you to ---.

## ATTORNEY DONNELLY:

I'll speed up. Sugarhouse is currently in \$100 million plus, almost \$150 million expansion where we will be adding additional gaming product, additional amenities and so on. All this was committed to way back when in the initial licensing hearings. And so that's another element of not only additional competition, but interest.

I'll wrap up with when I was looking to writing the statement I looked through a lot of reasons to show a specialized interest and I came across --- I looked a lot at economists just to see what quotes there might be. One really struck me from <a href="Kings">Kings</a>. Not that I'm endorsing necessarily what

he said, but he had a statement that stuck in my mind. Something along the lines of two misses for the poor are great, two trains for London to New York not so great.

And that's what I think we want to try to bring forth to this Board, that adding additional supply to this market where there's insufficient demand now is not going to be a happy thing we don't believe for Sugarhouse, for the rest of the casinos, and for the Commonwealth. And for all of the people that have an interest in the health and welfare of the casino. Thank you.

# CHAIRMAN:

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Okay. Thank you, Counselor. Market East.

## ATTORNEY HAYES:

Mr. Chairman, members of the Board, again Kevin Hayes on behalf of Market East
Associates. Our positions are set forth in our responsive brief, so I'll try to be very brief in my response to Sugarhouse's Counsel. As a general rule, Market East Associates does not oppose Sugarhouse's Petition to Intervene. If the Board is so inclined to grant their Petition to Intervene we request that certain conditions be placed on that, on that

:08:36 1 approval.

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First and foremost we would respectfully request that the Board strike the written statement which accompanied the December 16th submission of Sugarhouse because it is --- doesn't comply with the Board's regulations relating to the written statement and it violates rules of evidence pertaining to administrative proceedings.

Next, we would ask that Sugarhouse not be afforded any participation that is greater than the parties themselves. In other words, clearly Counsel has indicated that he would like to participate in pre-hearing discovery. There's nothing in the Board regulations or in the Rules of Evidence pertaining to administrative proceedings which would entitle them to that and we would strongly oppose that. Lastly, any effort that --- any attempt to request by Sugarhouse --- and I don't know if that's still out there, that they would be able to cross examine our witnesses during the proceedings, we would respectfully request that that be denied as well.

We think it's clear that the Board has discretion in determining the extent that a party can participate once granted intervention and we would

:09:51 1 defer to the Board on that. Thank you.

## 2 CHAIRMAN:

:09:54 3 Thank you very much. PA Gaming

:09:58 4 Ventures.

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## ATTORNEY FITZGERALD:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 6 Again, my 7 name's Robert Fitzgerald. I'm here on behalf of PA 8 Gaming Ventures. I don't think I need to repeat the 9 arguments and the objections that we raised in our answer and objections that we filed on 10 11 September 27th. Suffice it to say that it is our 12 position that Sugarhouse should not be permitted to 13 intervene in our licensing proceeding for three 14 reasons. First, and I think that's a point that has 15 been made in most of the objections and answers, the 16 so called interests that Sugarhouse has identified. 17 Primarily the purported interest in what they call a 18 direct and competitive harm that another Philadelphia 19 casino might cause can only be grounds for 20 intervention if one is to disregard the plain 21 language of the Gaming Act. There is and can be no 22 dispute that the Gaming Act requires that two casinos 23 be licensed in Philadelphia. Section 1304 requires that the next 24

Category 2 License that this Board issue be in

Philadelphia. Section 13 --- excuse me. That was

Section 1307. Section 1304 is even more explicit.

It says, two Category 2 License facilities and no

more shall be located by the Board in the city of the

first class.

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The General Assembly determined that a distribution of Gaming and Slot Machine Licenses allowing for two Category 2 casinos in Philadelphia was necessary to provide Philadelphia, the only city of the first class, its fair share of expected revenues and development. An unanticipated turn of economic events frustrated the first attempt to build and license that first Philadelphia casino. As a result Sugarhouse has, for the last years --- last six years, enjoyed what is effectively a monopoly position in the city.

At its core we think the petition is merely an attempt by Sugarhouse to maintain the status quo, notwithstanding a clear intent of the legislature and the requirements of the law. This interest in denying the competition is admittedly very real and very personal to Sugarhouse, but it's not the legitimate direct, substantial or immediate interest that might justify intervention.

I do want to be clear, the substantial

direct and immediate is the standard. That's what's sets forth in the regulation. And all of the discussion about the federal standard and separation of powers, I just don't think it applies nor does the standard that might be set forth in the general rules of administrative practice and procedure. The rules governing this licensing proceeding and intervention in this proceeding are set forth clearly in Section 441A.7Z.

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The second reason that Sugarhouse intervention should be denied is because it's simply not necessary. The issues that Sugarhouse claims that require its participation, the competitive harm that we talked about and the enforcement of the Gaming Act's ownership criteria will be fully presented, discussed and considered at PA Gaming Ventures' January 28th hearing even without Sugarhouse's participation. The Gaming Act requires nothing less from PA Gaming Ventures and this Board in that these issues receive a complete hearing. Thus to apply the standards set forth in the regulations, Sugarhouse's alleged interests will be, quote, adequately represented.

Lastly, Sugarhouse made speculative pronouncements regarding the damage a second

Philadelphia casino will do to the gaming market across the Mid-Atlantic and northeast sections of this country. At this hearing I need only note that Sugarhouse is simply wrong when it suggests giving a license to PA Gaming Ventures will fail to meet the Act's demands for revenue, development and job opportunity.

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I won't spend time on the details. At the January 28th hearing, PA Gaming Ventures will establish the economic benefits, the operational viability and the employment development that will result from its building of the Hollywood Casino. The salient point here is that Sugarhouse's fear that a second casino will result in the demise of gaming is not grounds for intervention. It's simply not true.

If I may, I'd like to address a little more fully Sugarhouse's alleged interest in enforcing the ownership and multiple license limitations in Sections 1304 and 1330 of the Gaming Act. Sugarhouse directed its concerns to only some of the Applicants and PA Gaming Ventures, which is one of those Applicants. Again, I don't think it's necessary or appropriate at this hearing to show that PA Gaming Ventures satisfies the requirements to the Gaming Act

1 on these issues.

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I will note, however, that I don't think, contrary to the representation of Mr.

Donnelly, that this is a new issue that's going to be raised by Sugarhouse's intervention. As the Board may be aware, PA Gaming Ventures has been involved in a number of communications with the OEC to discuss its ownership structure, its compliance with 1304 and 1330. PA Gaming Ventures will be attending a second pre-hearing conference with the Bureau of Licensing and the OEC on January 14th, and the role that these issues may play at the January 28th hearing will be discussed at that time.

Most importantly PA Gaming Ventures will, of course, address its ownership structure at the hearing and will answer at the time any questions the Board and its staff might have. In sum, there have been and will be opportunities to fully address the meaning and application of Sections 1304 and 1330. I would only state that the multiple license limitations were intended and has always been understood to allow for a Licensee to own one-third of another license. And PA Gaming Ventures' proposal adheres to that understanding and that Penn National Gaming, Inc. is only one-third owner of PA Gaming

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Of course, there are many details

pertaining to Penn's control or lack thereof of PA

Gaming Ventures. On that point, the Board's

clarifying regulations provide the contractual

interests including those in management contracts are

not to be considered when determining ownership

interests. That's set forth in Sections 441A.17,

paragraph G and I.

Even so, PA Gaming Ventures and Penn have worked closely with the Board staff to explain the details of Penn and PA Gaming Ventures management and operations agreements and to explain how they do not conflict with the Act's requirements. The real point here, of course, is that there's nothing in Section 1304 or 1330 that provides a reason for Sugarhouse to be a party in the licensing proceeding.

Clearly the issues of ownership and control have been and will be more than adequately considered. Sugarhouse can contribute nothing to those discussions or to the resolution of that issue, at least certainly identified nothing that it can contribute. Which brings me to the request for discovery.

Sugarhouse has essentially made in its

:16:49	1	paper, and I think today, that it does not know if
:16:51	2	there is a problem with PA Gaming Venture's
:16:53	3	application. Therefore, asks leave to find out what
:16:56	4	it can, and this is the definition of a fishing
:17:00	5	expedition. As explained in our papers, discovery is
:17:03	6	unnecessary, inconsistent with and contrary to the
:17:06	7	governing regulations and unfairly prejudicial to PA
:17:06	8	Gaming Ventures.

We ask for the request for discovery be denied and the hearing move forward. PA Gaming

Ventures --- in conclusion PA Gaming Ventures opposes the request for intervention and ask that the Board exercise its discretion to deny the Petition to Intervene. Thank you.

#### CHAIRMAN:

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Thank you, sir. EHL Local Gaming?

# ATTORNEY PITRE:

Not represented here today.

# CHAIRMAN:

Okay. Stadium Casino?

# ATTORNEY KOHLER:

Good afternoon. I'll be very brief.

As Mr. Donnelly mentioned, Stadium Casino does not oppose intervention. The reason for that is not that I necessarily disagree with Mr. Fitzgerald or Mr.

Fabius, but having been much involved in these intervention cases that have been cited in the Appellate Courts we see too much exposure on appeal.

And, you know, simply put we don't want to have to do this twice.

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With that said, intervention gives, you know, a very limited role under the Board's regulations and the statute. There's no right to discovery. There's no right to Cross Examination under the statute and, in fact, for our Intervenors there's no right to even really do a presentation. The right is to submit an expert report or written testimony.

We ask the Commission that if they do grant intervention, that the participation should be limited. As to 1304 and 1330, which were also raised against Stadium Casino, whether or not Sugarhouse is adequately represented by the OEC and BIE, in general they certainly are on 1304 and 1330. As Mr. Donnelly may not be aware, those issues are addressed in great detail in the suitability reports and I'm sure are going to be addressed and represented well by OEC at the suitability --- at the licensing hearings. With that I'll rest.

#### CHAIRMAN:

Thank you very much. Okay. Tower: 19:30 2 Entertainment.

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## ATTORNEY FABIUS:

I'll refrain from repeating points of my colleagues.

We certainly agree with respect to the conditions if intervention is granted. I'd like to focus why Tower Entertainment is in a unique position. Market competition in and of itself is not sufficient grounds to establish a substantial, immediate, direct interest required for intervention.

Mr. Fitzgerald already walked through 1304 and 1307 requiring a second Category 2 License facility. The Board is presently in litigation in which Tower Entertainment is an intervenor. It's at Commonwealth Court where there were oral arguments in December. Chief Counsel, Doug Sherman, argued at that hearing in front of Commonwealth Court that even if all five Applicants were found --- were unable to demonstrate the eligibility of suitability the Board under 1304 and 1307 would have to put the applications back out for bid and attempt to effectuate the mandate in 1304 and 1307.

The significance of that is to the extent Sugarhouse feels it's actually injured, the

correct forum is General Assembly and the text of Sections 1304 and 1307. You know, General Assembly expands small games of chance, and did not touch 1304 and 1307, leaving two Licensees in the City of Philadelphia.

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A direct interest, which Mr. Donnelly concedes he has to demonstrate. A direct interest means the matter complained of caused harm to the party's interests, i.e., there is a causal connection between the harm and the violation of law. To the contrary, there's no violation of law. The law says there shall be two Category 2 facilities in the City of Philadelphia.

But more importantly the causal connection is the statute, not the present licensing proceeding. So, there's no causal connection between the perceived injury and the proceeding in which they're seeking intervention. Therefore they can't substantiate a direct interest.

I would respond to two specific points as well. Mr. Donnelly says there are three

Applicants for which he has explicitly contested eligibility, Tower Entertainment is not one of them.

Tower Entertainment's ownership is not a secret.

It's on the Board's website, it's Bart Blatstein.

Bart Blatstein does not have any ownership interest in any other casino in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

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There's a minority interest under one percent of Mr. Robert Bogel (phonetic). He does not have any ownership interest in any casino in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. There is no 1304 or 1330 issue with Tower Entertainment. There is no eligibility issue raised in Sugarhouse's petitions. That puts them in stark contrast to each other Petition to Intervene that the Board has granted in prior licensing applications.

Parx obtained intervention status in
Valley Forge contesting Valley Forge's eligibility as
well as established resort hotel. Mountain View
Thoroughbred Racing Association obtained intervention
status in Penn Harrah's Gaming in 2010 on the grounds
that Penn Harrah's Gaming was not eligible for a
Category 3 License. And Meadows obtained
intervention status in the Application of Woodlands
Fayette, LLC on the grounds that Woodlands Fayette,
LLC was not a well established resort hotel.

They have no eligibility argument.

They have no interest in Tower Entertainment and even if the Board were to grant intervention in the other

applications we would ask that the Board deny an intervention in Tower Entertainment's application.

Thank you.

#### CHAIRMAN:

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Thank you.

## ATTORNEY DONNELLY:

Mr. Chairman, may I reply one minute?

## CHAIRMAN:

Tell you what, why don't we get the OEC first and then we'll give you one minute?

## ATTORNEY MILLER:

Chairman and members of the Board, we really don't have a dog in this fight other than to make sure that the Board is aware of our position with regard to the regulations and Sugarhouse's compliance with the same. As is explained in our answer and objection, we believe that Sugarhouse has simply not met the requirements for intervention in a licensing hearing. And we don't believe it's an abuse of the Board's discretion to deny the petition. However, if the Board were to grant intervention to Sugarhouse we ask that the Board not give them any competitive advantage over the other Applicants. Providing discovery to Sugarhouse, providing Sugarhouse the

means of obtaining documents which they're not entitled would give them such a competitive advantage, and we ask that if the Board were to use their discretionary powers to grant intervention that they deny the right to discovery or any other method of obtaining a competitive advantage by Sugarhouse.

Thank you.

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Mr. Donnelly.

## ATTORNEY DONNELLY:

One minute.

#### CHAIRMAN:

One minute.

## ATTORNEY DONNELLY:

In our written statement we did address a direct, substantial, immediate standard. We did not --- although I disagree I think the standard is direct. We addressed it and I think we meet it.

Number two, the Board does have discretion, I think, but it would be an abuse of discretion and Bensalem makes very clear it would be an abuse of discretion to turn down this application. Number three, the argument that the law mandates that this second --- this license be reissued, that's in litigation right now. And that's an opinion that's held by persons.

But other people have different opinions, so that --we're not commenting on that litigation. We do know
it's in litigation.

To the extent that Penn says that we don't believe that there's a problem with their application, that's not correct. We do believe there's a problem with their thing. And then finally just close up, again, I come back to the case law I think which was very clear that we've met the standard for intervention.

#### CHAIRMAN:

All right. Thank you, sir. Questions from the Board? Ex-Officio members? Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. The matter's now closed. I note it's 1:25. The Board will take a recess why don't see say 'til 2:15. And when we come back we'll begin today's public meeting. So we're in recess until 2:15. Thank you all.

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HEARING CONCLUDED

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings, hearing held before Chairman Ryan was reported by me on 1/8/2014 and I Lacey C. Gray read this transcript and that I attest that this transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceeding.

:27:55

Locuy C. Liney
Court Reporter